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Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-Letterism): assumptions, commitments and 
shortcomings. 
‘You come in here with a head full of mush and you leave thinking like a lawyer.’ 
Professor Kingsfield, The Paper Chase (1973) 
     SHANE KILCOMMINS 
1. Introduction 
It has always struck me when asking postgraduate law students to write research 
proposals in which they should work through the core elements – question, 
structure, methodology, originality/location in the literature – how challenging 
they find the process of articulating their methodologies. The issue of 
methodology is a difficult one for lawyers for a variety of reasons: we are not 
ordinarily exposed to quantitative and qualitative methods at undergraduate 
level, and we are often reluctant (initially at least) to push sociological, 
conceptual or standpoint accounts.  Whilst many of these concerns are 
understandable given the heavy emphasis on conventionalism at undergraduate 
level (though this is being ameliorated in recent years), it seems clear that these 
gaps extend to even the most fundamental of methodologies for lawyers –  
doctrinal legal method. Consider, for example, the following attempts at 
articulating this methodology:  
‘A doctrinal methodology will be applied to evaluate the evidential and 
criminal rules which legitimate our adversarial framework’.  
‘The project will involve doctrinal legal analysis. Various provisions of 
the Constitution…will be examined in order to fully understand what 
procedural requirements are mandated by Irish law. Furthermore, case 
law dealing with the rights of... criminal defendants…will be considered.’  
‘This project will…examine the legislation from a legal doctrinal point of 
view, consisting of an examination of the statutory provisions involved’. 
Standard positivist methodology will be used to analyse how the regime 
regulating the ... has changed. Standard legal methods will be used to 
analyse and synthesise legal sources (case law, legislation, constitutional 
principles). 
Although we can argue over the details of the various representations, they are, 
to my mind at least, broadly accurate, capturing roughly what most us would 
outline when we navigate the swampy textual lowlands of legal rules, and 
engage with dense institutional legal practices relating inter alia to craft, 
interpretation, and authority. The principal concern with these statements relates 
not to their accuracy but to their depth. Are they sufficient? How will they look 
to a non-legal observer (who may be an assessor)? Do they appear rigorous? 
How would they compare with the methodologies offered by postgraduate 
students in different disciplines?  
On the face of it, the explanations look thin, implicitly painting a picture of a 
method which is simplistic, thickly descriptive, and relatively unskilled, a join-
the-dots,  ‘taxonomic stock-taking’1 exercise that could be undertaken by any 
adult with basic knowledge of the English language and some time on his or her 
hands.  And yet, as lawyers, we know this is untrue. We know that law is 
technocratic, employing rigorous analytical processes, emphasising precision 
and inductive-deductive logic, but also fidelity to complex institutional 
practices. If you doubt this, try to remember the first full case you read as a first 
year law student. Perhaps you too struggled with the dense narrative, the strange 
presentation, the seemingly endless layers of substantive and procedural rules,  
the elusive search for the ratio and for ‘fit’ more generally, and with the 
analysing, distinguishing  and synthesising skills demanded of you in 
interrogating its content. 
Those initial struggles allowed you, in time, to pass through a portal – the 
threshold concept of doctrinal law – enabling you to ‘think like a lawyer’. It is 
the complexity of that learning journey which is not reflected in the statements 
outlined above. Nor should we expect that it would be captured. For the most 
part, doctrinal legal methodology is something which is acted upon by us as 
lawyers but rarely articulated in a systematised way that documents what we do 
when we seek to accurately posit the law on a particular issue.
2
 We all know 
what doctrinal legal reasoning is (or what it is not), but we rarely examine or 
reflect upon its overarching principles and throughlines. What follows is a loose 
attempt to unpack some of the assumptions and commitments that underpin 
lawyers’ efforts at wading through layers of authority, its ordering, and its 
interpretation.  
The properties underpinning a doctrinal legal approach.  
Doctrinal legal method emphasises coherence and unity. It involves the search 
for a ‘system’ of general, logically consistent principles, built up from the study 
of particular instances. This system is built on empirical and rational 
foundations. It is loosely empirical in that lawyers work with the raw data of 
cases and other legal provisions. It is rationalist because it presupposes that the 
system is logical and internally coherent. As Weinrib suggests, it is an 
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‘immanently intelligible normative practice’.3 This intelligibility is rooted in 
logical deductions derived from a priori propositions, and the principles of 
inductive generalisation and analogous reasoning. The basic building block of 
deductive reasoning is the syllogism in which a conclusion is inferred from two 
premises.
4
 A classic example is as follows: 
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.  
In a legal setting the deductive syllogism – reasoning from a generalised major 
premise to a minor factual premise – is dependent upon the establishment of the 
factual pattern (minor premise) (F), the identification of the relevant legal norm 
(major premise) (R), and the application of the norm content to the determined 
fact to produce a particular legitimate conclusion (C). It can be presented as a 
simple formula: R + F = C.
5
 The following would look like a syllogistic legal 
translation of a legal norm relating to vague terms in contract law:
6
  
Major Premise: All contracts with vague terms are void. (Rule) 
Minor Premise: The contract in the present case has a vague term. (Fact) 
Conclusion: Therefore the contract in the present case is void.  
Analogical reasoning attempts to show that the facts of a particular case (F) are 
substantially similar to those in the binding precedential case (R) and should 
therefore have a similar outcome (C). Inductive legal logic, in contrast, involves 
reasoning from the particular to the general to produce a normative assertion. 
By observing examples of a number of particular instances, a general rule is 
posited. The more instances produced, the safer it is to rely upon the accuracy of 
the general rule. It would translate as follows:  
Premise One: A High Court case held that a contract with a vague term 
was void. 
Premise Two: A second High Court case held that a contract with a 
vague term was void. 
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Premise Three: A third high court case held that a contract with a vague 
term was void. 
Conclusion Therefore, all contracts with vague  terms are void.  
The important thing about deductive, inductive and analogous reasoning  is that 
the validity of the  argument depends purely on logical form. Provided the 
premises are correct and accurate – taking care to avoid flawed syllogisms or 
the fallacy of ‘hasty generalisations’ – and any analogies are relevant, the 
conclusion will be valid.    Of course, in addition to its rationalist morphology,  
the practices inherent in doctrinal legal reasoning are also argumentative in that 
they encourage  argument about the premises, the extent to which they apply, or 
the analogies fit.
7
  
Doctrinal legal reasoning also emphasises law’s insulated, ‘internal point of 
view’.8  The coherence  of the discipline ‘points not outward to a transcendent 
ideal, but inward to the harmonious interrelationship among the constituents of 
the structure of justification’.9 Legal reasoning is autonomous, and there is no 
need for recourse to non-legal reasons or justifications. Questions and solutions 
are founded upon distinctly legal materials, demarcated from competing 
normative claims to truth. In this sense, doctrinal law employs an 
epistemologically internal way of knowing.
10
  We ‘know’ therefore that 
justifications based on a statutory provision or  a valid precedent, for example, 
are legal reasons that form part of the ‘inner logic of law’, whilst appeal to the 
authority of Joyce’s Ulysses is outside of the law, and cannot form part of its 
conceptual coherence. 
In relying on it as a method for answering a research question, one implicitly  
takes seriously the  institutions
11
 and concepts through which law expresses its 
structural coherence. Doctrinal legal method is, for example, premised on valid 
sources of law which  serve to limit the scope of any legal question and its 
determination; in assessing conduct, legal functionaries cannot stray beyond 
these ontological sources, the ways in which they are coordinated to each other, 
and their hierarchical arrangement. This relates not only to law application but 
also to law creation. This institutionalisation is wholly routinised given its 
systematic acceptance by agencies such as courts, legislatures, police, 
regulatory officers, prosecutors, citizens and so on.
12
  The properties of law – 
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particularly the scheme of authority it invokes – demands that it is taking 
seriously. As MacCormick notes:
13
 
[A]ll persons have reason to take seriously the requirements that law 
imposes. They have reason to do so whether or not they are personally 
inclined to endorse the law’s requirements as morally desirable or 
morally obligatory, and whether or not willing to pursue personal 
preferences where these diverge from what the law requires. There are 
powerful reasons for conformity, and these can have a daunting reality 
even for someone who, on good grounds, dissents for fundamental 
reasons from the state’s rules requiring certain conduct.   
In relying upon doctrinal legal reasoning as a methodology, one accepts or 
assumes that law is normative in that it guides and provides reasons for action. 
It is, in this sense, a unified normative order not  premised on systems of 
predictions, negotiations, incentives, or beliefs.
14
 It provides the ‘bad man’, for 
example, with an anti-authoritarian,  ex ante conception of the legal system,  
permitting him to conduct himself according to knowable rules? It also is a 
benchmark for the ‘good citizen’ who seeks to act in good faith by  conducting  
his or her activity in line with a prescribed order.   
It is very comprehensive in that it can claim authority to engage in all kinds of 
regulation: legal systems ‘either contain norms which regulate [behaviour] or 
norm conferring powers to enact norms which if enacted would regulate it’.15 It 
is also strongly authoritiative. It is a system ‘which claims supreme authority to 
interfere with any kind of activity’.16 Out of the total complexity of a particular 
social problem, doctrinal legal method helps to distil what is relevant – as least 
what is relevant according to a legal lens – and make authoritative (and final) 
declarations in respect of that problem.
17
  
Doctrinal legal  reasoning is also limiting in that  sets boundaries to the extent to 
which legal functionaries can intervene, and to what can be achieved.  All 
citizens and officials have to operate within ‘the rich but nevertheless insulated 
world of precedents and statutes.
18
 It is premised on a Rule of Law framework 
which restrains the arbitrary or coercive exercise of executive authority, where a 
strong state must have respect for and indeed yield to its constraints.
19
 Anything 
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not the subject of rules cannot be determined, but maybe in the future, and 
anything subject to rules must operate in ways that are compatible with them.  
Doctrinal legal methodology is largely conservative (‘formal’) in that it has a 
strongly backward looking orientation; it respects legal  institutions, and 
demands fidelity to existing rules. It is also innovative (‘grand’), however, given 
its evaluative aspects and its potential for alteration through rules of change.
20
 
Dworkin neatly captures this  conservative-innovative dynamic: ‘propositions of 
law are not simply descriptive of legal history in a straight forward way; nor are 
they evaluative in some way divorced from history. Propositions of law are 
interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description and 
evaluation, but is different from both’.21  
In relying upon the method to answer a research question, one generally accepts  
the rationality of the subject area, its location within an institutional context,  its 
internal epistemology, its hierarchical and coordinated features, its 
encompassing and authoritative embrace, and its pragmatic utility. This 
acceptance helps to validate its claims to truth.  Anyone relying on it is also 
working on relatively safe ground given that the ‘the life of the law consists to a 
very large extent in the guidance both of officials and private individuals by 
determinate rules which, unlike the application of variable standards, do not 
require from them a fresh judgement from case to case’.22  
So what is good about such a methodology? 
Despite the pejorative undertones associated with ‘black-letterism’, it has much 
to commend it. To begin with, it emphasises the coherence of law’s institutional 
configuration. In specifying the criteria of legal validity and the delegated unity 
of the legal order, it facilitates conceptual coherency and consistency, giving 
integrity to law and the decision-making process. What if there were no rules 
and no reasoning process?
23
 There is an important truth in it in that it reflects 
what lawyers and legal functionaries actually do. The derivation of legal 
principles generally occurs through a process of continuous testing, using 
hypothetical fact patterns or contrasting examples to clarify the scope of rules 
and reasoning being distilled. Deductive reasoning along the model of syllogism 
is also a characteristic feature of ‘most well-done judicial opinions – that is, the 
conclusion can be reconstructed as following deductively from a statement of 
the applicable rule of law and the statement of the facts’.24 Simplistic as it is, the 
formula R + F = C is employed in a good many instances in legal reasoning. Its 
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self-referential internal process itself helps to confirm its coherence – to give it 
a structure of truth. 
As a mode of reasoning, it has a practical, pragmatic value; it is not undertaken 
its own sake. In a world dominated by association and associative interaction, 
we need rules – to ensure compliance, to maintain order, and to regulate 
behaviour along some agreed lines.  The uncertainty and insecurity of a more 
arbitrary or ad hominem decision-making process not linked to rules or stable 
institutional practices would, in contrast, seem unimaginable. Moreover, the 
rules themselves, and their application, work most of the time. They are 
therefore decidedly useful, permitting authoritative resolution of disputes and 
problem cases. 
25
 Courts and legislatures also continue to possess the possibility 
of being the  ‘last authoritative voice’ on all attempts at dispute resolution or 
settlement (which can provide a practical rebuff to other social, political or 
moral methodological claims), and the law continues to  regulate the legitimate 
monopolisation of coercion and violence within states.
26
  
 
The ‘withering away’ of law and legal reasoning has not occurred and is 
unlikely to do so given the stakes at play, embedded interests, and the 
ontological insecurity that it would generate.  We continue to argue and seek 
reform from within the existing paradigm of law and its ‘heavy instruments’.  
Nor have other alternatives to dispute resolution, truth finding, prediction and 
control proven more acceptable. Reducing social complexity in this way does, 
for example, ‘compensate for the cognitive indeterminancy, motivational 
insecurity, and limiting coordinating power of moral norms’.27   
 
It is also highly technocratic and skilled. Consider, for example, whether a 
particular fact pattern constitutes harassment. This will involve framing the 
facts to fit with the institutional requirements of law; distinguishing between 
civil and criminal considerations; engaging with multiple substantive and 
procedural legal instruments; and employing skills which emphasise analysis 
and synthesis, the process of argumentation, the power of reasoning, and the 
importance of wording. The public nature of this technocracy also facilitates 
transparency providing a benchmark for critique, and the possibility of change.  
 
What are the dangers? 
Employing doctrinal legal method to answer a research question also raises the 
possibility of particular types of criticism. Though you may be very confident 
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that your justifications are nailed on, you should at least be aware of the types of 
arguments that can be made against its use. The broadest and perhaps most 
obvious is a moral one  – is it sufficient and morally just that a legal finding is 
valid simply because it follows a deductive logical form?  What about the 
morality of the decision and its contribution to human flourishing? Whether law 
should be severed from morality, or can be, are difficult questions that have 
troubled lawyers for a long time. This is not the place to rehash previous 
jurisprudential attempts or offer new solutions (I am incapable of the latter). 
Nevertheless it seems reasonable to suggest that a doctrinal view of law as a 
means of social regulation provides, at best, an incomplete picture.  
Moreover, some would argue that the development of a doctrinal approach can 
very much be seen as part of the project of modernity whose primary function 
was to rid the western world of local, contingent, irrational, and non-objective 
phenomena.
28
 The value of cloaking legal method in a deductive garb are 
obvious; it will appear objective, value free, rational and fair – reinforcing law’s 
claim to truth. This search for certainty in law has been questioned, some 
explaining it in psychological terms as nothing more than a childlike need for 
determinacy.
29
 Students upon entering law school, for example, are told to 
abandon emotion and empathy, childish and naive characteristics that are out of 
place for anyone wanting ‘to think like a lawyer’. Teachers of law encourage 
students ‘to put away childish things’.30 The coherency of law thus comes to 
serve the controlling force occupied by a father for a child.
31
 Totalising thought 
tendencies of this kind should make us suspicious, and at least open to the 
possibility that situational and subjective experiences may be marginalised by 
the unitary impulses of  such foundational claims.
32
  
Many commentators would argue that legal decision making does not always 
have an intrinsic order. They ‘are not the products of logical parthenogenesis 
born of pre-existing legal principles but are social events with social causes and 
consequences’.33 Law is a social endeavour. This  limits the extent to which 
certainty can be achieved. Because it is social, legal propositions are not 
verifiable in the same way that empirical propositions are (i.e. the boiling point 
of water).  How, for example, can we be sure that different judges would arrive 
at the same deductions in any give case? How, particularly in times of rapid 
social and industrial change, can we guarantee that for every legal dispute there 
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is a fixed antecedent rule already in place which will permit simple, formal 
syllogising?
34
 It will also be possible to confine a particular ruling to its 
particular facts so as to avoid having to follow it.  
The interpretation of legal rules is therefore, in part, based on the 
predispositions of  decision-makers who are not asocial, apolitical or amoral 
automata. Indeed some commentators would argue that the ‘correct legal 
solution’ is usually nothing more than the ‘correct ethical and political solution’ 
at a particular point in time.
35
  Thus doctrinal legal rationality  is a process 
which is open to manipulation:
36
 ‘every decision is a choice between different 
rules which logically fit all past decisions but logically dictate conflicting 
results in the instance case’.37 Furthermore, whilst appeal courts mostly concern 
themselves with the niceties of legal particulars (substantive and procedural 
rules), trial courts have to contend themselves with facts, and facts by their very 
nature are elusive. They do not comprise the hard, objective, data of science.
38
 
Even the traditional sciences rely on particular ways of knowing and organising 
events and data that are not fixed and absolute,
39
  but are influenced by power 
relations, shared beliefs, and subjective interpretations of collecting and 
interpreting data. 
Law is also based on language, not algebraic concepts, and language by its very 
nature has an ‘open texture’ that often gives rise to a number of legitimate  
interpretive choices. Language is not (always) a transparent, objective medium. 
It is enmeshed in subjective reference points (signifiers) for the both the listener 
and the speaker,
40
 that militate against the objectivity of interpretation. There 
will often be a choice in the rules, principles or standards to apply (and the 
enforceability of same),  or exceptions to invoke, thereby permitting arguments 
which purportedly follow the logic of legal reasoning to lead in different 
directions with different outcomes. As Kelman notes: ‘In every dispute about 
the appropriate resolution of a legal controversy, rule like solutions, standard 
based solutions, and intermediate positions will uncomfortably co-exist, none 
fully dominating either day to day practice or a fortiori justificatory rhetoric’.41 
Black-letterism, therefore, relies on a form of essentialism, when it posits the 
view that there are essential meanings to words and laws that can be objectively 
understood through a process of adjudicative neutrality, rather than meanings 
having to be chosen through a process of interpretive construction. 
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Moreover, fidelity to the a priori principles of the past in some instances will be 
unsuitable in a contemporary context having regard to changes in cultural, 
social, political, economic and moral contexts.
42
 In this sense, legal rules are not 
hermetically sealed from broader considerations.
43
 Law is therefore too 
autopoietic in not giving sufficient thought to context. Too much emphasis on 
black letterism and in tracing the celestial lines of development of various legal 
rules can also divert attention away from engaging in broader discursive 
analysis of the working of rules,  the ideological, economic and socio-political 
currents running through them, the dynamics of how they change, and the 
policy and contextual implications for choosing one rule over another. It has 
also been argued that doctrinal legal reasoning is  presentist, seeking to rely on 
the past to explain the present. This approach ‘reassures us (lawyers) that what 
we do now flows continuously out of our past, out of precedents, traditions, 
fidelity to statutory and constitutional texts and meanings’.44 If the lawyer is a 
monist and a presentist, then the historian is a pluralist (looking for contested 
meanings), and a contextualist (seeking to understand the past in terms of the 
past).
45
 
Doctrinal legal reasoning can also help inculcate a set of attitudes towards the 
legal system in society, exhorting in particular its legitimacy on the basis of its 
neutral nature,
46
 whilst ignoring the underlying structural inequalities of power 
which are imbricated in the cross-currents of society. The ideology of 
objectivity, egalitarianism and the strict application of rules can mask and 
mystify law’s partiality, particularly its capacity to preserve and maintain the 
status quo for those in power.  Hiding behind the ‘false consciousness’ of  black 
letterism are the variety of hierarchical interests that it serves. As Kennedy 
suggests, ‘bias arises because law school teaching makes the choice of hierarchy 
and domination, which is implicit in the adoption of the rules of property, 
contract, and tort, look as though it flows from and is required by legal 
reasoning rather than being a matter of politics and economics’.47  It  also has 
implications for legal practice, particularly the notion that what lawyers actually 
do is apolitical and independent, merely following the inner technical logic of 
the law. This might be reassuring, but it is a denial of the political and social 
realities of legal practice: 
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[B]lack-letterism works as a convenient mode of denial. It enables legal 
academics and lawyers to engage in what is a highly political and 
contested arena of social life – namely, law – and to pretend that they are 
doing so in a largely non-political way. The main advantage of this is that 
they can go about their daily routines without assuming any political or 
personal responsibility for what happens in the legal process. However, 
the insistence that lawyering is a neutral exercise that does not implicate 
lawyers in any political process or demand from scholars a commitment 
to any particular ideology is as weak as it is woeful. Such an image is a 
profoundly conservative and crude understanding of what it is to engage 
in the business of courts, legislatures and the like.
48
 
Feminists would argue, for example, that the theory and practice of law 
(including doctrinal legal reasoning) is not neutral  but has been shaped too 
much by male orientated values and concerns  (it ‘speaks to men’ by making 
‘maleness’ the norm for the regulation of human relations).  For them, the 
discourse of law has always been a male discourse that excludes the voice of 
women.
49
  In particular, they seek to highlight the patriarchal ideas that pervade 
the law (often through ‘standpoint epistemology’), and to raise the ‘woman 
question’ by examining the variety of different ways in which the law fails to 
take account of the values of women and how it might disadvantage them.
50
 
Law, therefore, as a mode of social regulation, may be ‘deeply antithetical to the 
myriad concerns and interests of women’.51 But black-letterism does not wish to 
engage in these kinds of debates or controversies about the rules. Rather it 
wishes to focus exclusively on the  rules, assuming that they flow from a sterile, 
closed logical system that is neutral and objective. This dogmatism can close us 
off from the exclusionary values and stereotypes that often underpin rules and 
can serve to reproduce hierarchies of power.
52
   
  
Conclusion 
A doctrinal legal approach is an extremely valid, purposeful methodology, 
which carries both a scholarly and practical currency. It has a long and 
established history. It epistemic outlook emphasises the logic of law and the 
value of reasoning; the normative character of rules; institutional coherency;  
technocracy; internalism and self-referential validation;  the limiting tendencies 
                                                          
48
 Hutchinson (n 1) 307-308.  
49
 Siobhan Mullally, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence’ in Tim Murphy (ed), Western Jurisprudence (Thomson Round Hall 
2004), 351-385. 
50
 Susan Leahy, ‘Bad Laws or Bad Attitudes? Assessing the Impact of Societal Attitudes upon the Conviction 
rates for Rape in Ireland’ (2014) 14(1) Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies 18. 
51
 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge 1989), 164.  
52
 Margaret Davies, Asking the Law Question (Sweet and Maxwell 1994), 120.  
associated with rule determinism; the ‘last authoritative voice’ positioning of 
law; its extensive potential range; legal craft; and the importance of being part 
of ‘an interpretive community’.  
In employing it, however, it is important to be aware that its assumptions, 
commitments, and foundational claims can be challenged. Increasingly law is 
being viewed though a variety of lenses: history, hermeneutics, sociology, 
anthropology, political theory, moral philosophy, economics, feminisms, and so 
on. These are all legitimate standpoints and avenues of enquiry which challenge 
the perception of law as a unitary and neutral expression of social rules. Legal 
research in Ireland is  altering to reflect more catholic, ‘house of intellect’, types 
of enquiry. This trend increasingly incorporates the use of new methods (for 
example, from history, philosophy, jurisprudence, sociology, English literature, 
psychology, and quantitative and qualitative methods); greater 
interdisciplinarity (law and history, law and economics, law and literature, law 
and sociology, law and politics); a more open embrace of theory (feminisms, 
critical race theory, etc.); an increased willingness to adopt standpoint 
perspectives (victims, women, children, persons with a disability, LGBT etc.); 
and the incorporation of more policy based analyses into legal curricula. All of 
these developments offer lawyers more and more opportunities for critical 
engagement with their subject matters. Thus, whilst we continue to frame 
subjects in terms of the relevant legal rules (as we must), this momentum opens 
up possibilities for new types of dialogue. ‘Thinking like a lawyer’ in the future 
may mean more than just being  skilled at rule handling.  
